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 Few companies recognize the big bite that thefts, both large and small, take out 
of their profit margin.  It is estimated that theft in some form absorbs 5 percent of all 
business revenues, which translates into about $652 billion in losses per year.  Small 
businesses take a disproportionate share of the hit.  The purpose of this paper is to 
highlight the rapidly expanding scope of the employee theft problem and to suggest 
common sense Risk Management techniques that companies can use to prevent losses 
and to reduce the damages from those that occur.  In many cases, the loss control 





 There is widespread agreement that occupational fraud and abuse is big 
business, that it is widespread, and that it is beginning to reach epidemic proportions 
(Coffin, p.8).  Firms of every size in all industrial categories and at all organizational 
levels are victims of fraud and abuse by their own employees.  Occupational fraud—
whether asset misappropriation, corruption, or fraudulent statements—is one of the 
costliest problems facing business today, particularly small private firms (Anonymous 
1, p. 11), and despite massive efforts to contain it, it is one of the fastest growing 
industries in the country.  Thefts of company assets more than doubled from 1999 to 
2004 (Anonymous 2, p. 56) as the employee theft problem began to spin out of 
control.   Occupational fraud affects, or has the potential to affect, every business in 
the country (ACFE, p. 8).  Risk management of theft and other crime exposures is 
extremely important, and no employer should be naive concerning the magnitude of 
the problem or blissfully think or hope that it will never happen to them. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to heighten employers’ sensitivity to the employee 
dishonesty problem and to help them better understand and control employee theft.  
The paper emphasizes how critical it is for them to learn as much as possible about 
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occupational fraud and the devastating financial impact that it can have on a firm’s 
bottom line or even its solvency.  Perhaps even worse, insider theft can insidiously 
corrode trust and confidence between employer and worker—the glue that holds the 
workplace together.  It saps employee morale and diverts the attention of managers 
from other tasks.   
 
 To achieve its purpose, the remainder of the paper is divided into seven 
sections.  The first explains the scope of the employee crime problem, and the second 
offers lessons and insights into who commits occupational fraud.  The third section 
discusses the elements that must simultaneously be present for fraud to exist, and the 
fourth section discusses reasons why more thefts are not reported.  The fifth section 
provides some commonsense observations about how the impact of theft can be 
prevented or reduced—what companies can do to help deter fraudulent conduct.  The 
sixth section explains how the risk of financial loss by theft can be transferred to an 
insurance company, and the final section contains the summary and conclusion of the 
study. 
 
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 Statistics on employee theft are astounding.  U.S. companies lose more to 
internal fraud than to shoplifting, although shoplifting incidents tend to get more press 
(Ryan, p. 8).  According to one source, employee theft and fraud accounts for 30-50 
percent of all company failures (Lurz, p. 112), and in the retail field, theft accounts for 
80 percent of all losses (Ritter, p. 25).  These findings have serious implications for 
small businesses that face increasing margin pressure from all directions.  It means 
that billions of dollars of profits hemorrhage away each year and that the premiums 
they pay for commercial insurance are driven up.  It also means that consumers end up 
paying higher prices for the goods and services they purchase. 
 
 Statistics on employee dishonesty gathered by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) show that firms lose on average $9 per day per employee 
for insider theft (Lurz, p. 112).  The median dollar loss came to $159,000, which 
amounts to about 5 percent of all annual revenue, and for all businesses, the tab comes 
to about $652 billion per year (ACFE, p. 8), making fraud an industry of its own 
(Coenen, p. 1).  Another source, using a different methodology, suggests that the 
problem is more rampant than the ACFE figures indicate.  It reports that employee 
theft costs businesses an astounding 20 percent of every dollar earned (Gips, p. 16). 
The repercussions of employee theft are far more harmful to the bottom line than has 
traditionally been recognized, and the impact is more far-reaching.  Three in five 
privately held companies can expect to be victimized by employee-perpetrated theft of 
funds or equipment in any given year (Anonymous 1, p. 11).   
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III. WHO ARE THE "ACTORS"? 
 
 Trusted employees from all walks of life, from all income ranges, and in every 
business discover creative ways to make their job more rewarding.  Every employee is 
a potential suspect when it comes to who is capable of committing fraud, i.e., from a 
low-level staff member to a highly educated, hard working, seemingly mature and 
responsible senior officer.  Some observers say that 6-8 percent of all employees have 
taken or have considered taking money from their employer (Knapshaefer, p. 45).  
There are more ways for an insider to take advantage of their workplace than most 
executives can imagine.  Too often, companies set themselves up to be victimized by 
theft.  The opportunity for employees to divert company funds into their own pockets 
is simply handed to them because of weak internal controls and oversight (Cressey, p. 
30).  
 
 The level of authority a person holds within the organization tends to have a 
significant impact on the size of loss in a fraud scheme.  Most insider thieves are not 
aloof loners, introverted nerds, or high school dropouts.  Rather, the typical 
perpetrator is a married, college-educated white male who exhibits all the qualities 
one looks for in an employee—high integrity, trustworthiness, and devotion to the 
job—and who is higher up the organizational ladder (Tyska, p. 17).  While there may 
be more stings by rank-and-file employees (41.2 percent) simply because of their 
greater numbers, the take per person is much larger at the higher levels.  On average, 
losses from fraud by owners and executives are nearly five times larger than those of 
managers and 13 times higher than those caused by employees (ACFE, p. 5).  Senior 
members and owners of an organization are more likely to be in positions of trust, to 
have access to the money and books, and to have authority to override or change 
control procedures in order to conceal the fraud (ACFE, p. 42). 
 
 Men commit 61 percent of all insider crime offenses, and the median loss 
caused by men is two and one-half times greater than those caused by women, 
$250,000 to $102,000, respectively.  At least a part of this disparity is a result of men 
tending to hold more management and executive-level positions in many 
organizations.  As the perpetrator’s age rises, so do the losses from their fraud.  The 
median loss for those age 60 and over is 28 times greater than that for those 25 or 
younger. There is also a strong correlation between the education level of the 
perpetrator and the size of the median loss.  The median loss caused by those with 
postgraduate degrees is over four times greater than losses caused by those with high 
school diplomas (ACFE, pp. 44-45).  
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 The costliest theft cases occur in organizations with fewer than 100 employees.  
One important reason why small companies bear the brunt is that small companies 
cannot afford the kinds of sophisticated internal controls and systems that prevent or 
deter embezzlement.  Schemes at small businesses cost an average of $190,000, 
higher than the median loss in even the largest organizations (ACFE, p. 5), and help 
contribute to the short lifespan of such businesses (Mohsin, p. 271). 
 
 It is interesting to note the effect of computers on the average size of insider 
thefts. Technology has dramatically increased the size of insider theft jobs.  The 
average employee embezzlement comes to $25,000, but higher dollar volumes are 
associated with computer-assisted thefts, which average $430,000.  When coupled 
with poor controls, computer embezzlement can be very difficult to detect, especially 
when it involves sophisticated measures, collusion, and the falsification of documents 
(Knapshaefer, p. 44, and Lurz, p. 112). The massive infusion of computer technology 
into the workplace has clearly raised the bar for the minimum level of loss control 
protection most companies need. 
 
IV. THE FRAUD MODEL 
 
 Understanding the elements that precipitate employee fraud is the first step in a 
program to prevent it.  Criminologist Donald R. Cressey interviewed nearly 200 
incarcerated embezzlers in the late 1940s and developed a fraud model, which has 
become known as the “Fraud Triangle,” containing three factors that are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for fraud to result.  The three factors are perceived pressure 
facing the perpetrator, perceived opportunity to commit and conceal the crime, and the 
person’s attitude or rationalization of the fraudulent act.  While later researchers have 
refined the Cressey model, it remains much as he presented it almost 60 years ago.  
The Fraud Triangle is depicted below, and the three key variables that must be present 
simultaneously for a fraud to occur are discussed in the following sections. 
 
         
Opportunity 
 
       Pressure                                                       Rationalization 
 
Source: Adapted from Auditing Standards Board (ASB), Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, New 
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V. MOTIVES/PRESSURES TO STEAL 
 
 Motives for stealing rest on unquantifiable human instincts and are as highly 
subjective, messy, and diverse as the nature of human character.  The three major 
reasons are lifestyle, finances, and emotions. The lifestyle factor becomes operative 
when workers steal money to pay off an out-of-control credit card debt (McCormick, 
p. 122) or to enhance their lifestyle with the purchase of a bigger house, faster car, 
expensive recreational property, or extravagant vacation (Wells, p. 1).  They take 
advantage of an opportunity to steal because of weak or unenforced control policies 
and procedures.  They may rationalize that everyone else is doing it. 
 
 The financial factor comes into play when the worker needs more money to 
meet medical costs or to defray other emergency expenses. The worker may see the 
employer as a faceless and avaricious giant with a corrupt ideology who will never 
notice the loss of a few dollars, a few pieces of apparel, a few supplies, or a little bit of 
merchandise (Ritter, p. 25). Some workers may steal for the thrill of it, or they may 
appreciate and need the challenge of stealing—using their sophisticated understanding 
of the firm’s technology or its financial statements to mastermind an elaborate scheme 
(Knapshaefer, p. 43).   
The emotional factor becomes operative when an inequity-sensitive worker 
feels that he/she is not being treated well.  He/she may have missed a promotion or 
feel underpaid, or feel an unfairness in pay, perhaps because a proximal referent in a 
similar position in the same or a different company is earning a higher salary and/or 
working fewer hours (Fishman, p. 61). Feeling overworked and/or underpaid, he/she 
seeks revenge in the most convenient way possible. 
 
VI. OPPORTUNITY TO STEAL 
A simplistic answer as to why employees steal is to say that they are in a 
position to take what does not belong to them and that it is easy.  After all, employees 
have full access to the crime scene (Ryan, p. 8).  They know the firm’s procedures and 
policies, cultural norms, and networked information systems, and they will likely 
know their fellow workers and their habits.  In many types of business, i.e., 
convenience stores, employees work with only one or two other employees and may 
be left alone on a routine basis. They have ready access to the cash register and to 
concealed places where high-ticket items are kept, thus optimizing the opportunity to 
steal.  In such idyllic circumstances, some workers cannot resist the temptation to take 
advantage of and exploit any weaknesses or vulnerabilities they see in management 
controls. 
 
Distilled to its basics, the primary reason employees steal is that employers 
create the environment for it.  They steal by design and exploit opportunity simply 
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because they can, i.e., the employee is in a position to override all internal accounting 
or financial procedures. There is ineffective oversight (Ritter, p. 25).  The failure to 
consistently enforce and constantly monitor management policy, procedures, and 
accounting controls and to create an ethical environment that discourages dishonesty 
will inevitably lead to a loss of assets that can devastate the company’s profit margin. 
 
1. EMPLOYEE RATIONALIZATION 
 
 In most cases, employee theft begins innocently enough (Ritter, p. 25).  For 
example, the thief might be an executive who has extensive knowledge of how the 
company operates, learns how to ignore or circumvent established controls, and is the 
beneficiary of a system that functions on the assumption that he is trustworthy.  He 
may lose his moral compass and “dust the cash register” to supplement his salary for 
$10,000 cash to capitalize on a business opportunity for which funding is not 
otherwise available.  Or he may be dealing with a personal issue such as a gambling 
or drinking addiction or even a mental problem that leads him to a life of crime.  He 
may view the transgression not as stealing but simply as borrowing funds that will be 
repaid when his financial situation improves or when he achieves the success that has 
heretofore eluded him.  He thinks the company is too big to notice.  He is probably 
firmly convinced that he is smart enough to conceal his duplicity, and he usually does 
for a while.  The median length from the time the scheme begins until it is detected is 
18 months (ACFE, p. 4).  
Alternatively, the culprit might be a single-parent mother in a low-level 
position who finds herself late on credit card payments or needs to purchase a big-
ticket item.  So, she may pilfer company supplies or “short” the cash drawer for a 
“little” cash to help meet the down payment on a much-needed new car.  She has 
every intention of returning the money next month but then “forgets” to do so.  After a 
period of time during which her initial attempt goes without detection, she “borrows” 
money again, perhaps in a slightly larger amount, and the abuse escalates into ever 
more frequent and more serious events.  And the pattern continues, with the thief 
becoming more anesthetized to the wrongdoing and ever more confident that she can 
hide any traces of her theft.  She inflicts ever more serious financial damage as the 
incidents pile up.  
   
VII. WHY MORE EMPLOYERS DON'T PROSECUTE 
 
 Employers often place great trust and have implicit faith in their employees.  
They may think of them as extended family that are honest, hard-working, and have 
only the company’s best interests at heart.  Sometimes employers refuse to believe 
that they are a victim of theft, particularly if the theft is by a long-term, trusted, and 
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heretofore presumably loyal employee, right up to the moment that incontrovertible 
evidence forces them to confront the awful truth. 
 
 The victimized employer is first likely to be astonished, shocked, and angry, to 
feel hurt, and to experience an utter sense of betrayal.  Then follows the dread of 
reputation degradation—the fear that public knowledge of employee theft and 
dishonesty in the organization will endanger the trust of customers and negatively 
impact sales and revenue, since dishonesty or deviant behavior in one department may 
be perceived by observers to be the underlying behavior across other departments 
(Anonymous 2, p. 56). This helps to explain why the latest ACFE study shows that the 
victim organization referred the case to a law enforcement authority only 70 percent 
of the time (ACFE, p. 56).  Other sources report a much lower referral rate.  One 
study indicated that only 40 percent of employees caught stealing are referred to the 
criminal justice system and only 20 percent are required to make some form of 
restitution.  Almost unbelievably, the remaining 40 percent face no civil or criminal 
penalty (Lurz, p. 112).  
  
 Hence, many employers choose not to prosecute the employees who prey upon 
them.  They would rather handle problems of occupational fraud quietly and without 
police involvement (Coffin, p. 8) by discreetly firing the perpetrator and refusing to 
serve as a reference in the future (Lurz, p. 112).  The alternative is to face the specter 
of negative publicity, embarrassment of having unwittingly fallen prey to an inside 
con artist, public humiliation of the company, difficulty in getting future loans, and 
enormous time obligations and costs (legal and investigative fees) of prosecuting the 
guilty employee.  And there is no assurance of full recovery, or any recovery, even 
with a favorable verdict.  Only 20 percent of all fraud losses are ever recovered, 
including proceeds from restitution and insurance, and 37 percent of victim companies 
never recover any funds at all (Coenen, p. 1). 
 
 Admittedly, employers face a dilemma with regard to monitoring their 
employees.  They wish to trust their employees, have faith in their integrity, and 
create an environment of mutual confidence and respect between management and 
workers.  However, as stewards of the firm’s and possibly their own assets, managers 
have the fiduciary responsibility to safeguard and protect those assets.  Hence, some 
managers have opted to use surreptitious devices such as hidden cameras to detect 
employee theft.  This practice may go against the grain of many small firms that 
attempt to create an environment where employees are trusted.  Some small firms may 
feel that degradation of the work environment can lead to an adversarial worker–
employer relationship, diminished productivity, and other dysfunctions.  The key is to 
strike a balance between placing confidence in persons once they are hired and 
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creating strong internal controls at a reasonable cost to eliminate their temptation to 




 A priori evidence indicates that the most cost-effective way to deal with fraud 
is to prevent it.  Hence, companies should exert every effort to prevent exploitation 
via insider theft and fraud, though they will probably never be so clever as to design a 
foolproof system to thwart all human shortcomings (Fishman, p. 60).  The most 
prudent measures are to screen employees for characteristics associated with low-theft 
activity before hiring them and to take preventive steps after the hire by establishing 
and implementing sound internal controls—checks and balances that help to prevent 
fraud and to limit financial losses when fraud occurs.  The company should review 
these management control policies periodically and update them as needed.  As an 
example, when Internet channels are added, the company should make sure that this 
does not open new avenues for potential fraud (Knapshaefer, p. 44). 
 
To deter abuse and thefts, companies should look for areas of vulnerability.  
Identifying the areas of operation most affected by theft enables top management to 
measure the effectiveness of loss prevention and reduction programs, to focus on 
problem areas that have the greatest potential for improvement, and to formulate 
strategies for preventing fraudulent schemes (Anonymous 1, p. 11).  While there are 
no simple, foolproof solutions to the prevention of fraud, here is a list of positive, 
structured loss-control initiatives gleaned from the literature, none of which require a 
huge investment in infrastructure or personnel that companies can use to avoid or 
mitigate the effects of theft and fraud. 
 
1. DUAL CONTROLS   
 
 Separation of employee duties is a strategy that can help the internal control 
system to work.  Firms make themselves vulnerable to theft and fraud if they do not 
develop and implement policies about how financial transactions are initiated, 
authorized, recorded, and reviewed.  Since 30 percent of all occupational fraud is 
committed by employees in the accounting department (ACFE, p. 5), it is essential 
that different employees should handle different accounting and financial tasks. Those 
who make decisions about what equipment, materials, and supplies will be purchased 
or what work will be performed should be separate from those who handle the 
checkbook or are in charge of payments to suppliers or vendors.  A scenario in which 
ordering and payment are the responsibilities of just one person is fraught with the 
danger of fraudulent expense reimbursements in the form of skimming (accepting 
payment from a customer but not recording the sale), cash larceny (taking cash or 
checks from daily receipts, which have been recorded, before they can be deposited in 
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the bank), kickbacks, or other forms of occupational fraud.  When duties are 
segregated, each area can act as a check against abuses by the others (Lurz, p. 112). 
 
 In particular, to maintain adequate cross-departmental responsibility, the 
controller (with accounts-payable duties) should not supervise purchasing and 
receiving.  Rather, in order to minimize the opportunity for fraudulent billing 
practices, the controller, purchasing agent, and receiving agent should report 
separately to senior management.  It is far better for the purchasing department to 
negotiate the contracts for equipment or work, an operations unit such as receiving to 
verify that the equipment is delivered or the work is done according to specifications, 
the accounting department to process the purchase order, and senior management to 
sign the check. Owners should check all orders to make sure they are accurate and of 
the quality intended. A firm set of dual checks and balances (a control technique 
called redundancy), with multiple executives signing off on trade contracts, funds 
allocations, and disbursements, is a key way to prevent temptation and to help stem 
the rising tide of employee theft and abuse. Subsequent bookkeeping adjustments, 
even minor ones or adjustments made to correct an error, should be approved by the 
owner or a trusted assistant (Mather, p. 8). Of course, even the most elaborate control 
system can be circumvented if two or more people collude to commit the fraud (Lurz, 
p. 112, and Fishman, p. 60).  
 
 Dual controls with separate decision making, authorization, and paying 
functions are more important in smaller firms than larger ones.  The reason is that 
multiple responsibilities (i.e., asset custody and accounting responsibility) often fall 
upon the shoulders of a single employee in a small firm.  That person could easily 
have both the opportunity and means to conceal theft.  It is difficult to design 
foolproof systems in such circumstances that eliminate the ability to conceal theft if 
the employee is savvy enough to know the loopholes in the system and to hide those 
loopholes (Knapshaefer, p. 45, and Lurz, p. 112). 
 
 A small business is particularly vulnerable if only one person is involved with 
or looks at a single transaction—that is, the same person is responsible for decision 
making (buying), authorizing payment, and writing the check.  Any person 
empowered to both record and process a transaction is in a position to engage in check 
tampering—to either steal and then forge a check, issue a genuine check to a fictitious 
entity, alter a legitimately issued check, duplicate (print) a counterfeit check, or 
engage in some other check fraud scheme.  The challenge to the management of a 
small business is to find the appropriate level of staffing and to designate the 
appropriate persons to have supervisory authority, without giving authority to many 
people and spending inappropriate amounts for loss prevention activities 
(Knapshaefer, p. 45). 
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2. HIRING GOOD PEOPLE   
 
 The fight against theft starts with the pre-employment screening procedure for 
new hires that will have access to organizational assets.  The employer should use 
selection and detection procedures such as conducting reference checks and running 
background verification and searches to find out as much as possible about the 
applicant’s previous experience with other employers and law enforcement 
authorities. This information can be obtained for modest sums, in some cases as little 
as $10 per employee (Mather, p. 8). 
 
Depending on the position, screening may include drug tests, credit histories, 
honesty (integrity) tests, and driver’s license and criminal records checks on all 
applicants, particularly those who are in sensitive positions that involve the flow of 
money or have access to checks, credit card numbers, or other items that are easily 
stolen.  Screening can uncover job applicants who lie on or embellish their resumes or 
fail to include crucial information regarding criminal convictions and thus present a 
significantly higher risk for potential problems.  Pre-employment screening, because it 
reduces the company’s vulnerability to the risk of theft, is an extremely important 
anti-fraud technique since prevention is more cost effective in the long run than 
prosecuting the employee and attempting to recover losses (Wells, p. 1).  It is best for 
employers to hire workers with a high level of cognitive moral development and then 
to treat them as trustworthy and honest once they are hired (Appelbaum et. al., p. 
175). 
 
 It is worth repeating that the company should put emphasis on hiring only the 
most qualified and trustworthy employees.  Managers should be educated about how 
to use interview techniques that help distinguish honest from dishonest applicants.  
For example, it is better to ask open-ended questions during the interview process.  
Open-ended questions tend to be more revelatory about the candidate’s background, 
attitudes, and behavior patterns (Ritter, p. 25).  Also, there should be multiple 
interviews and interviewers for each applicant (Ryan, p. 8).  Taking sufficient time to 
properly interview potential employees is an investment that will reap huge dividends 
down the road, enabling the employer to ferret out the predatory employee who seeks 
employment with the goal of defrauding the employer (ACFE, p. 55). 
 
 Interviewers should review resumes for evidence of job hunting and avoid 
putting those with a multi-job history in payroll administration, accounts payable, or 
other key financial positions.  The interviewer should also discuss issues of ethics and 
ask the candidates to discuss any ethical dilemmas they have experienced in the past 
(Lurz, p. 112). 
 
 Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 8, 2007 
32 
3. ETHICS MANUAL 
 
 Employees are opportunistic about stealing on the job (Lurz, p. 112).  They are 
more likely to engage in occupational fraud and abuse if they know the company is 
not taking an aggressive position regarding employee theft and, after weighing the 
risks, believe there is a fairly good chance they will not be caught.  It is well 
established that the lower the risk of being caught stealing, the more likely it is that a 
theft will take place.  Fraud seeks the organization with the lowest level of protection 
(Knapshaefer, p. 43).   
 
 The ethical culture of an organization can only rise as high as the standard set 
by top management.  Members of the management team have an important role as 
authority figures and, as such, have the duty to initiate and implement a corporate 
culture that focuses on and reinforces honesty (Appelbaum et. al., p. 175).  All fraud 
starts with the owner (Dennis, p. 55), and management that is perceived to be unfair 
and dishonest will beget dishonest employees (Wells, p. 1).  Hence, there is a need for 
a written guidebook or manual containing the organization’s code of conduct and 
ethics policies that emanates from and has the firm support of the senior management 
of the corporation, whose ethical conduct serves as a benchmark for the organization’s 
employees.  The manual should be made available to every manager and to every 
employee in every department. 
 
 The manual should clearly define behavior expectations, i.e., what activities are 
unacceptable, the internal controls in place to prevent fraud, and the punishment for 
those who do not comply.  The ethics policy should become operative at the time of 
new hire orientation and continue until the employee separates.  Workers exposed to a 
work group that condones theft will be more likely to steal (McClurg and Butler, p. 
25).  Hence, companies should imbue workers at the time of hire with the notion that 
preventing fraud is an all-hands responsibility and that every worker is accountable 
for his/her own actions and should share responsibility for the values and beliefs of 
the organization.  
 
 After the hire, the firm should sponsor positive and non-accusatory loss 
prevention awareness classes, workshops, and refresher briefings and provide other 
broad-based education updates and reinforcement of the ethics policy on an annual 
basis.  Each employee should be required to sign off on the policy every year.  There 
should be strong and consistent signals from the organization that any form of theft is 
unacceptable.  The point should be driven home that ethics are not just a moral 
imperative, but the foundation of good business and that employee dishonesty 
eventually costs everyone in the company through higher prices and thus lower 
profits, adverse publicity, and decreased morale (Wells, p. 1). If the ethics policies and 
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the emphasis on integrity are in a manual, are strictly implemented and regularly 
evaluated (Mohsin, p. 271), and are repeatedly mentioned in intra-company training 
sessions and the sanctions for ethical shortfalls are spelled out and are vigorously 
enforced, a climate is created and fostered whereby employees remain focused on 
ethical behavior. 
 
 The ethics manual should be used in conjunction with well-defined accounting 
procedures and written job descriptions to establish accountability for each staff 
member.  When lines of authority and responsibility are clearly delineated, it makes it 
much easier to hold people accountable, to monitor their performance, and to 
encourage them to act with integrity in the conduct of company business (Lurz, p. 
112, and Mohsin, p. 271).  Of course, even the clearest lines of responsibility and 
authority can be abused by a dominant manager who chooses to override or 
circumvent the system to commit fraud. 
 
IX. OTHER PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
 
 Companies can use many other accounting policies and financial and 
organizational control features to flag and combat potential fraud, limit or mitigate the 
amount of damage that can be done, and provide optimum protection for the business, 
including: 
 
a)  Accounting Policies 
 
• Implement and strictly enforce a rule that no one in the purchasing area can 
take bribes (such as inflating invoices from a vendor and in return receiving 10 
percent of the invoice price as a kickback), or accept gratuities (say from a 
vendor as a token of the vendor’s appreciation for their help).  Nothing should 
be accepted—no entertainment, no free vacation, no beverages at Christmas, 
nothing.  Without such controls in place, purchasing agents may be tempted to 
accept kickbacks (Lurz, p. 112). 
• Use an independent party who is not involved with the daily checkbook 
transactions (collections and disbursements) to reconcile monthly bank 
statements before they are passed to the bookkeeper, and rotate both functions 
every few months (Mohsin, p. 271). 
• Document and scrutinize all reimbursable expenses incurred by employees.  It 
is easier to detect and trace fraudulent transactions and avoid paying phantom 
or padded travel and nonexistent meal costs if specific documentation is 
required for reimbursement and if every employee expense voucher is 
subjected to a pre-audit review before it is paid (Mather, p. 8). 
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• Restrict access to assets of physical value, such as inventory, to authorized 
employees, particularly if the assets are readily marketable and easily 
manipulated like jewelry or computer chips (Meiners, p. 53).  Conduct 
inventory audits on a periodic and sometimes unannounced basis to uncover 
pilferage or other misappropriation of non cash assets.  Random audits increase 
(1) the thief’s risk of being caught before he/she has the opportunity to alter, 
destroy, or misplace records or other evidence (Wells, p. 1) as well as (2) the 
company’s chances to uncover under-the-table dealings (Tyska, p. 18).  Studies 
reveal that companies with internal audit departments that regularly perform 
surprise audits suffer median losses about one-half the size of those that do not 
(ACFE, p. 4).  Audits help identify new vulnerabilities, measure the 
effectiveness of existing controls, and serve as a guide in the design and 
implementation of a better control system.  It is also prudent to use a third party 




b)  Financial Control Features 
 
• Since the asset that fraudsters target most often is cash, including checks and 
money orders (ACFE, p. 12), it is prudent to keep cash and other highly liquid 
assets in a well-secured location.  As a further measure to discourage theft 
attempts, companies can mine transaction data such as checking accounts, 
purchase orders, sales receipts, and other key documents to detect fraud of 
these items with good internal audits. It is a good idea to conduct an external 
audit on a periodic basis to assess the control performance of the firm and 
provide an independent evaluation of current internal audit practices (Mohsin, 
p. 271). 
• Institute a rule that all company credit cards must be signed out and all credit 
card expenses authorized by a purchase order (Mather, p. 8). 
• Checks should be signed only after carefully reviewing the supporting 
documentation (invoice, delivery receipt, purchase order), and then only the 
owner or a trusted assistant should have the authority to sign checks.  Audit the 
check-issuing process, keep blank checks under lock and key, and make sure 
checks are printed using the latest counterfeiting technology (Mather, p. 8). 
• Show attention to and embrace responsibility for the financial health of the 
organization.  Ostentatious displays of excess and disregard or indifference by 
managers toward their role and responsibilities is an invitation for employees to 
take advantage of their laxity and complacency.  A haphazard and cavalier 
attitude toward rules and regulations by management will filter down to and 
will soon be reflected in the attitudes of employees (Coenen, p. 1). 
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• Maintain an ongoing process that facilitates measurement of the impact of loss 
control programs.  Regularly review and evaluate procedures that are 
implemented (Mohsin, p. 271). 
 
c)  Organizational Control Features 
 
• Take responsibility as owner for approving all vendors and counting all goods 
received or delegate such authority only to a trusted assistant.  This will prevent 
conflict-of-interest situations from arising, such as an employee owning an 
undisclosed interest in a supplier and then negotiating a deal with the supplier, 
perhaps purchasing materials at an inflated price (ACFE, p. 17). 
• Refunds are a huge cost center in many kinds of business.  Institute a third-
party refund policy whereby refunds are issued only with the approval of the 
owner or a trusted assistant (Mather, p. 8). 
• Make sure that each employee takes vacation time. This gives others the 
opportunity to see the books when an employee is away and to expose any 
schemes in which he/she might be engaged.  Periodic job rotation is suggested 
for employees in sensitive positions in order to reduce the opportunity for fraud 
(Mohsin, p. 271). 
• Encourage open communication between management and staff.  Let everyone 
know the company is seeking information concerning larcenous intent and 
designate two “bypass” people or “go to” people (male and female) whom 
employees can approach confidentially about any suspected theft or fraud 
within the organization (Coffin, p. 8).  The company can simultaneously create 
a “watch-dog” (incentive) program for associates who uncover misconduct. 
• Many workers feel outrage when they know there is a thief among them.  A 
company can cash in on the moral fiber and goodwill of its employees by 
establishing a fraud hotline for employees (or customers or vendors) to 
anonymously report suspicious, unethical, or illegal activity to management, 
with no fear of job loss or other recriminations (Ryan, p. 8).  The reporting 
medium may be an anonymous phone call, a confidential hotline managed by a 
third party, an anonymous letter, or an anonymous message in a designated area 
of a website (Wells, p. 1).  Occupational fraud, particularly if it involves a large 
amount of money, is far more likely to be detected through a tip than by other 
means such as internal audits, external audits, or internal controls.  The ACFE 
has found that 34.2 percent of all fraud schemes are uncovered through tips 
(ACFE, p. 28).  Getting workers involved in the discovery of unethical and 
dishonest conduct is a key element in creating a culture based on honesty. 
• Theft is unacceptable.  It is a crime, and those who commit it should be treated 
as criminals (Schroeder, p. 86). The rapport between management and 
employees is reinforced if a zero-tolerance policy is instituted whereby every 
 Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 8, 2007 
36 
wrongdoer is prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law for every infraction, 
large or small, even in the face of police and prosecutorial resistance 
(Longmore-Etheridge, p. 74).  An immediate and consistent response to theft, 
even though it is unsettling to trace through years of historical financial data 
and the results may be only marginally productive, sends a signal to the staff 
and makes public the fact that those who steal do not do so with impunity and 
that the firm is serious about curbing insider fraud. 
 
X. NEED FOR INSURANCE 
 
 Every company should have Commercial Crime Insurance (CCI) to cover 
employee dishonesty and theft.  This policy covers most forms of occupational fraud, 
depending on the type of perils coverage the insured chooses.  Despite its obvious 
importance, however, it is vastly undersold.  One study showed that less than one-
fourth of all businesses purchase crime insurance (Anonymous 1, p.11), and other 
studies have shown that too often firms that have it do not have sufficient limits 
(McCormick, p. 122). 
 
 CCI policies are designed to indemnify the employer against employees who 
commit fraud for their own personal benefit or cause the insured to sustain a loss.  
Theft in the form of robbery, burglary, embezzlement, commercial bribery, or stock 
fraud is covered.  The burden of proof is on the insured to prove that a loss occurred.  
Unexplained inventory losses are not covered.  As might be expected, the policies 
contain subrogation provisions permitting the carrier to sue the wrongdoer up to the 
amount of indemnity (Wells, p. 1). 
 
 The most recent crime insurance policies require the insured to give notice of 
loss to the carrier as soon after discovery of loss as possible and to provide proof of 
loss, if requested, within 120 days thereafter.  While the word “discovery” is not 
defined in the policy, the form of notice is therein provided.  It is important that the 
insured make no accusation about employee misconduct without solid information 
(Malecki, p. 94). Further, the insured should adhere closely to policy requirements 
about notice and submission of proof of loss statements.  Late notice, for example, 
may be grounds for denial of an otherwise valid claim.  If a loss occurs, the insured 
should work closely with an attorney and his agent/broker at every step in the claims 
process to ensure that all legal formalities are met and that the carrier’s rights are not 
prejudiced (Henderson and Rodriguez, p. 1).  Of course, it is not the intent of the 
policy to cover employees who committed theft or dishonesty prior to the inception of 
the policy. 
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 Employee Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) goes hand-in-hand with crime 
coverage.  When the employer charges the employee with theft and then fires him, the 
employer is often slapped with a wrongful termination lawsuit.  The EPLI policy 
covers wrongful termination as well as sexual harassment and discrimination.  The 
policies may or may not cover attorneys’ fees (Bruegge, p. 13).  Before firing the 
perpetrator the employer should, of course, consult an attorney to help guide him/her 
through the proper channels.  The attorney can also make sure that documentation is 
prepared before termination that will limit or control damages and possibly avoid 
lawsuits. 
 
 The cost of CCI and EPLI coverage is not great.  A small employer with 15 or 
fewer employees might pay $800 in premium per year for $100,000 of EPLI coverage 
with a $1,000 deductible.  The firm could add $100,000 of commercial crime 
coverage to its business insurance coverage for only $50 per year.  Larger firms would 
naturally pay more (Bruegge, p. 14). 
 
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Protecting profits is critical to the vitality and survival of businesses both large 
and small.  The problem of employee fraud and abuse has so grown in size and scope 
that it threatens the underpinnings of business and government.  Controlling loss is a 
continuing challenge to businesses of every size and type.  Since dishonesty wears 
many faces, the thievery may be of many types.   
 
 A potential for occupational dishonesty exists when there is opportunity for 
fraud, the employee has a non-shareable financial problem, and the employee can 
rationalize his/her theft. The most cost-effective countermeasures to combat internal 
theft are vigilance in hiring practices and the deployment of loss-control programs 
such as adequate accounting policies, financial control features, and organizational 
control features.  An essential element in fostering employee compliance with loss-
control efforts and harnessing the goodwill and cooperation of employees in 
identifying thieves in their midst is the tone at and commitment from the top.   The 
importance of the company’s beliefs and values should be repeatedly emphasized by 
management from the date of employee hire to the date of dismissal. 
 
 Unfortunately, given recent patterns and trends in the employee theft area, the 
future seems brighter for the criminal than for the victims.  Employee theft is clearly 
on the rise, and each innovation to prevent or deter workplace theft is met with 
equally innovative countermeasures as fraudsters continue to come up with new ways 
of stealing.  Given the magnitude of the problem, the potential for improvement is 
huge, and the company that is successful in preventing or reducing the number of 
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employee thefts stands to benefit greatly.  Reducing fraud helps increase profits, keeps 
the business running smoothly, and frees up the time of the owner for concentration 
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